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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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The Process of EU Accession: What will it bring to Southeast 
Europe? 
Introduction: The state of play 
Ten new members will join the European Union on 1 May 2004 to great fanfare. European 
leaders will make grand speeches about the  re-unification of Europe after the artificial 
divisions of the 20
th century. It will certainly be a great moment in European history when 
the rich country club becomes a truly continental Union. But this enlargement will leave 
outside the Union many European countries which see joining the EU as a fast-track to 
prosperity and stability.  
 
Another four countries are already knocking on the EU’s door, and more will start 
demanding entry over the next few years, particularly from South-Eastern Europe (SEE). 
At the front of the queue are Bulgaria and Romania. These two countries have completed 
the easy chapters in their entry talks, and their governments hope to finish negotiations in 
2004. But the hardest issues will only go on the table later this year, and the EU wants to 
see them tackle corruption, economic reform and inefficient state bureaucracies before it 
will consider them to be ready. Romania and Bulgaria have set themselves a target-date of 
2007 for accession, but they may have to wait a year or two longer if other wannabes are 
nearly ready to join by then. The EU prefers to take in groups of countries, rather than 
cranking up the accession machinery several years in a row. 
 
The EU has officially offered the Western Balkan countries and Turkey the prospect of 
eventual membership – but it has made no such promise to the other countries on its new, 
expanded borders. Belarus is too authoritarian, Moldova too poor, Ukraine too large and 
Russia too scary for the EU to contemplate membership even in the distant future. 
 
Croatia has a good chance of catching up with Bulgaria and Romania quickly, but it 
probably cannot finish the whole accession process before about 2009. Zagreb lodged an 
official application for membership in 2003, and the Commission will deliver its response – 
including a recommendation on when Croatia should start negotiations – in Spring 2004. 
Croatia’s economy and public administration are in good shape in comparison with 
Bulgaria and Romania. But the government in Zagreb has other conditions to meet before 
it can start negotiations, the most important being the handover of indicted war criminal 
General Ante Gotovina to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague.  
 
However, EU officials are pouring cold water on the hopes of some Macedonian and 
Serbian politicians to submit applications for membership soon. Both countries have to 
resolve the question of their final status  – as well as achieving greater political and 2 
economic stability – before the EU can think seriously about starting an accession process, 
say officials in Brussels. 
 
Turkey – the EU’s longest-standing applicant – is also hoping to inch closer to membership 
in 2004. The EU will reconsider Turkey’s bid to join in December. If Ankara can show 
consistent improvements in respecting human rights, treating the minority Kurds, and 
keeping the military out of politics, the EU will probably allow Turkey to start accession 
talks in 2005. Those negotiations could last many years, however, because none of the 25 
members is keen on Turkey joining rapidly. The country would bring in problems that are 
on a completely different scale from the other wannabes. Turkey has a large and rapidly 
growing population that might well exceed Germany’s soon after accession. It also has a 
large farm sector that would swamp the Common Agricultural Policy. And then there is the 
question of Islam. Turkey frightens many Europeans because it would be a giant in the EU, 
and one with a largely Muslim population. 
 
Even if the wannabes do their utmost to be ready in the next few years, there is no 
guarantee that the EU will enlarge again soon. The Union is getting more and more 
exacting in its requirements. Moreover, the Union may be in no fit state to accept more 
applicants for several years after 2004. Many of the current 15 members are wondering if 
they have already bitten off more than they can chew. The Union will suffer a lengthy 
digestion period after it absorbs the first ten. Once the full impact of enlargement on the 
Union’s institutions and policies becomes clear, the 25 members may have little appetite 
for another round. Their plates are already full with the Inter-governmental Conference that 
will finalize the EU’s new constitutional treaty in Spring 2004. Towards the end of the year 
they will start the next course of negotiations about the Union’s budget. Both of these 
debates will provoke soul-searching about the nature of the Union, and whether it should 
set geographical limits to its expansion.  
 
This paper considers how the accession process might work for SEE, what impact it is 
likely to have on the SEE candidates, and what lessons both the EU and SEE countries 




1  The accession process 
The stages in the accession process 
The EU first set out accession criteria to join in 1993, specifically for the post-communist 
countries to meet. For several years after these conditions were first set, it was not clear 
exactly which elements of the political and economic conditions had to be fulfilled for an 3 
applicant to be admitted to which benefits. But by the end of the 1990s, a rough 
progression had emerged of stages in the accession process: 
–  Privileged trade access and additional aid. 
–  Signing and implementation of an enhanced form of association agreement (Europe 
Agreements for the Central and East European countries, Stabilization and 
Association Agreements for South-Eastern European countries). 
–  Opening of negotiations, which has been explicitly dependent on a candidate’s 
meeting the democracy and human rights conditions since 1999. 
–  Opening and closing of the 31 chapters in negotiations. 
–  Signing of an accession treaty. 
–  Ratification of the accession treaty by national parliaments and the European 
Parliament, and referenda in some countries. 
–  Entry as a full member. 
 
 
What comes after a positive assessment from the EU? 
The first hurdle that any wannabe member-state has to jump is having its candidacy for 
membership accepted by the EU. The Union can turn a cold shoulder immediately, as it did 
to Morocco and initially to Turkey. A would-be candidate needs to be fairly sure of getting a 
warm reception from the EU, as a premature application can turn member-states against 
the idea of accepting it. For example, Croatia got a favourable reception in 2003 when it 
applied, but the same country would probably have received a frosty response had it 
applied just two years earlier. The EU member-states are easily scared by a country that 
says it wants to join but is far from having the basic requirements of political stability, 
territorial security and economic growth in place.  
 
Once the EU has favourably responded to an application, the European Council 
(comprising the heads of government) asks the European Commission to draw up an 
‘opinion’ or avis on the country’s application; Croatia’s opinion will appear in Spring 2004, a 
year or so after it lodged its application. This document sets out the Commission’s 
assessment of the country’s suitability as an EU member, and usually recommends 
whether or not the EU should begin negotiations with the country in the near future. Croatia 
will probably get a favourable opinion and a recommendation for negotiations to start in 
2005. The Commission will then begin a process called ‘screening’, in which Commission 
officials go through the country’s legislation to assess its compatibility with EU law and 
point out major discrepancies. 
 4 
The opening of negotiations is usually greeted with celebration in the applicant country. 
Turkey has been waiting for that moment for nearly four decades. But, in fact, the start of 
negotiations is one of the hardest parts of the process to manage politically, because it is 
the moment when political realities begin to sink in. The political classes, the business 
community and the public begin to realize what EU accession is all about. Not all of the 
news they receive will be welcome. The conditions for accession may look innocuous and 




The conditions for accession 
The EU set four conditions for membership at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993:  
‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The Union’s 
capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an 
important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.’ 
 
These conditions were designed to minimize the risk of new entrants becoming politically 
unstable and economically burdensome to the existing EU. They were thus formulated as 
much to reassure reluctant member-states as to guide the candidates, and this dual 
purpose of the conditionality has continued to play an important role in the politics of 
accession within the EU. The fourth condition reflects the member-states’ anxieties about 
the impact that enlargement might have on EU institutions and policies because of the 
increase in numbers and diversity, apart from the specific problems that CEE members 
might bring in. It is a condition for enlargement, whereas the others are conditions for entry. 
 
All of the accession conditions are general and vague, leaving a lot of room for the EU to 
interpret them. As the EU has elaborated what constitutes meeting the accession 
conditions, it has progressively widened the detailed criteria for membership, as new 
conditions have been added and old ones redefined. Moreover, new issues of concern 
arise, so the EU has added specific requirements for individual countries, such as the 
closing down of nuclear power plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, and improving the 
treatment of children in state care in Romania. 
 
It is very difficult to pinpoint exactly when each of the accession conditions has been met, 
giving the European Commission a degree of discretion in reporting on the candidates’ 
progress. The Copenhagen conditions do not provide a check-list of clear objectives; 5 
neither do they specify the means to achieve the stated goals. They are not like the 
conditions set by the IMF, where there are quantitative targets for macroeconomic 
performance. 
 
The first two Copenhagen conditions require definitions of what constitutes a ‘democracy’, 
a ‘market economy’ and ‘the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces’, all highly debatable and slippery concepts. The EU has never provided an explicit 
definition of any of them, although there are implicit assumptions about their content in the 
Commission’s opinions on the CEE candidates’ readiness for membership (published in 
1997) and the annual reports it has published on the candidates’ progress since 1998. 
 
The third condition, on the ‘obligations of membership’ is also open to interpretation. In 
previous enlargements, these were held to lie solely in the implementation of the ‘acquis 
communautaire’, which amounts to 80,000 pages of legislative texts already, but it keeps 
growing as the EU develops new policies and issues new directives, declarations and 
jurisprudence. For the CEE enlargement, the acquis was defined more broadly as “all the 
real and potential rights and obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework” 
(Gialdino 1995). 
 
This formulation is also open to minimalist and maximalist interpretations, and these in turn 
affect the demands made on CEE applicants. So far, the EU has generally presented a 
maximalist interpretation to the applicants. Candidates cannot have opt-outs on monetary 
union, Schengen or defence policy, even though member-states like Britain, Ireland and 
Denmark have them. 
 
Moreover, the conditions are a moving target as the EU’s agenda gets more detailed and 
more demanding because the Union itself develops new policies and responsibilities 
during the period while the candidates are preparing themselves for membership. Since it 
set the accession conditions in 1993, the EU has added new policy areas to its activities, 
such as justice and home affairs, and the Schengen area of passport-free travel; a 
common foreign and security policy, with a defence identity; and a common currency. All of 
these developments add to the requirements that the candidates have to meet before 
accession. The CEE countries had no possibility of negotiating opt-outs like those applying 
to some member-states on Schengen and monetary union. The candidates also have to 
take on the EU’s ‘soft law’ of non-binding resolutions and recommendations.  
 
Aspirant members have to become like the EU in certain areas viewed as essential to the 
future functioning of the EU. Regulatory alignment with the Single Market – which involves 
the removal of all trade barriers and meeting EU product and process standards – is non-
negotiable, and it was the first set of priorities presented to the CEE candidates by the EU. 
But is it appropriate for all the SEE countries? 6 
 
Ultimately, an applicant is ready to join when member-states are convinced that the new 
member will behave like a good citizen in the EU. A potential member-state has to show a 
certain style of operation – in its public policy-making and state administration – that looks 
familiar to member-states if it is to be acceptable. A country’s capacity to implement and 
enforce EU-inspired legislation effectively is an increasingly important part of meeting the 
conditions too.  
 
The acquis is divided into 31 different ‘chapters’ for the purpose of negotiations. Because 
progress in closing the chapters is one of the few clearly measurable parts of the process, 
candidate countries have concentrated their efforts on getting chapters provisionally 
closed, and opening new ones, in order to demonstrate their progress. But closing 
chapters does not necessarily guarantee a n earlier date for accession. Moreover, 
provisionally closed chapters can be re-opened later in negotiations, so the deal is not final 
until the accession treaty is signed. 
 
 
What will the conditions be for SEE countries? 
Over the years ahead, the EU is likely to add further refinements to its accession 
conditions. It will undoubtedly add more requirements to the list, as its own policies develop 
after the 2004 enlargement, and in order to tackle particular problems posed by SEE 
candidates. 
 
For future aspirants to membership, implementation and enforcement will be key. The 
Union is getting more and more fussy about compliance with its standards, and it will 
become even more exacting once the imperfections of the new members become 
apparent. Some of them will have trouble meeting the promises they made in negotiations, 
although others – like Estonia and Hungary – will probably be considerably better at 
implementing laws and enforcing regulations than Greece or Italy are. But a 25-member 
Union will be harder to govern than one of 15, so standards will matter more. To keep the 
EU functioning, the Commission will no longer be able to turn a blind eye to member-
states’ misdemeanours in implementing single market rules, and the Council will demand 
that all countries guard their external borders more effectively. That will raise the stakes for 
potential members too. 
 
The EU is likely to change the basis for accession negotiations from promises of future 
behaviour to evidence of implementation. This likely change is p artly the result of the 
difficulties experienced by the EU in getting the CEE candidates to prepare themselves 
fully for membership. In addition, Turkey is likely to start negotiations in the next few years, 
and many member-states are concerned that such a large candidate should prove its 7 
ability to enforce EU laws over a sustained period. That will change the basis of 
negotiations for all other candidates too. 
 
The EU may well elaborate additional conditions for SEE candidates, as it has already 
done for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia – the last on the handover of indicted war criminal 
General Ante Gotovina to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. In addition to 
similar demands on other countries for ICTY compliance, the EU is likely to demand 
improvements in governance; reductions in levels of corruption, organized crime and 




2  The transformative effect of the accession process 
Joining the EU requires a profound transformation of a country’s laws, institutions, policies 
and orientations. Gaining entry to the Union is much more difficult and complex than is 
joining NATO, which essentially requires political commitment and changes to the armed 
forces. It is also much more difficult to join the EU now than it was for poor countries like 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the 1970s and 1980s. The EU itself was less 
complex before the creation of the Single Market and the establishment of a common 
currency, so membership then required fewer adjustments. Moreover, in past 
enlargements, the EU allowed the candidates to negotiate long transitional periods and it 
provided much more aid to them after accession than it has offered to the current 
applicants. It was partly the experience of relatively expensive previous enlargements and 
very slow adaptation by poorer countries like Greece that led to such tight conditions for 
the CEE countries. 
 
EU membership now requires changes to a huge range of policies, and the reshaping of 
many of a country’s public institutions. The EU’s members have developed some form of 
coordination, harmonization or common rules in almost every area of public policy  – 
although the extent of harmonization varies greatly. Its effects range very widely, from the 
creation of market regulators to civil service reform, from border controls to hygiene 
standards in abattoirs. Moreover, the political and economic conditions are new in this 
enlargement, so the EU has an influence in CEE domestic politics that goes beyond the 
Union’s remit for its current member-states (see Grabbe 1999). 
 
The EU and its member-states are already involved in shaping political institutions too, 
through the creation of new agencies and new coordination procedures w ithin and 
between government agencies, as well as in transferring policies. The EU has had an 
impact on the reform of the civil service, public procurement, budgetary procedures, and 
regional self-government. The accession process puts direct pressure on three sets of 
relations between different parts of the state: the relationship between the executive and 8 
legislature; the emergence of a privileged accession team in the executive; and the 
relationship between central and regional governments (see Grabbe 2001).  
 
The stability of democratic institutions is one of the three general conditions for accession, 
and the EU has promoted the involvement of political institutions beyond the executive to 
implement and enforce the acquis. Yet, at the same time, the incentives and constraints 
created by the accession process support the emergence of a core national executive at 
the expense of other branches and levels of government  – including the legislature and 
regional actors. The way the accession process is structured encourages the emergence 
of a strong, central team to manage it, because the conditionality is based on implementing 
a vast array of legislation and procedural rules in order to comply with EU standards, which 
in turn depend on reporting from the centre of government to Brussels.  
 
This creates an ‘executive bias’ in the accession process, because of the structure of 
negotiations and the fact that EU actors mostly see the process of adopting EU norms as 
an administrative exercise. This bias can in turn exacerbate statist tendencies in applicant 
countries – as happened in CEE  – which were already evident owing to the previous 
decades of state socialism. If the EU continues with this approach, it could erode public 
support and involvement in European integration. Negotiations between bureaucracies do 
not necessarily contribute to the development of shared values as a basis for new 
structures of government. This has implications for the future behaviour of the applicants 
as member-states: ‘EU standards’ were frequently invoked as a means of legitimizing 
institutional frameworks in CEE, but the administrative bias of the accession process 
sometimes had the effect of impeding the development of a wider debate on forms of 
governance.  
 
The EU has become yet another actor in party competition. Pressures from the EU interact 
with domestic debates about both policies and governance. The interaction between EU 
pressures and domestic processes can be seen clearly in centre-regional relations as well, 
where there is ‘triadic engagement’ between the EU, national governments and sub-
national administration (Hughes et al. 2001). That engagement between Brussels and 
regional governments can appear threatening to countries that are sensitive to any 
potential threat to their territorial integrity. 
 
An appeal to ‘Europe’ is a constant feature of the domestic debate in CEE (see Fowler, 
2001, on Hungary), as in SEE. All sides and all political parties make this appeal, yet the 
EU is a confusing model, as political actors can point to the very different examples of how 
different member-states run their affairs and implement EU policies. The EU’s own 
diversity thus undermines its effort to export a single model of governance, and the 
accession process itself presents conflicting demands. This provides ammunition for many 
different sides in domestic political battles. 9 
 
Finally, the EU is currently unable to provide models in some of the areas where SEE 
candidate countries might need them most. When it comes to the most sensitive and 
difficult issues in the region, such as the status and treatment of minorities, human rights, 
corruption, organized crime, the EU is agnostic. Although potential members have to meet 
the political conditions, the EU has no democratic acquis  on which to draw to provide 
guidance to the candidates. The member-states are themselves diverse in their policies on 
issues like provision of bilingual education for the children of ethnic minorities, or on 
tackling corruption in the public sector. Although the members form part of a community of 
nations and share norms on what is and is not acceptable behaviour on the part of the 
state, the trickiest dilemmas of democracy cannot be solved by drawing on a codified 
guidance set down in EU law. 
 
 
3  Lessons from the 2004 Central and East European accession process  
Accession as a motivation to stick to reforms 
The most important effect of the prospect of EU membership is its role as an anchor to the 
reform process. The drive to join the EU has been one of the most powerful incentives for 
undertaking major reforms in the region. Through the tasks set annually by the European 
Commission, the EU ensures consistent external pressure on successive governments, 
helping to ensure continuity of reform efforts. The reform anchor role offered by the 
credible prospect of membership has been reinforced by tangible benefits linked to 
progress in reforms, such as additional aid, trade access and political support.  
 
Can these benefits be used to guide SEE countries during a long period of difficult and 
painful reforms? Only if the EU gives countries a clear timetable for receipt of benefits. 
When prospects for EU membership recede, it is more difficult to overcome domestic 
political opposition to difficult reforms by justifying hard choices in the name of EU 
requirements. For Bulgaria and Romania, the 2004 enlargement will be a stark reminder of 
their exclusion, which will make it harder for politicians in these countries to argue for more 
EU-inspired policy changes that are painful to implement. Slower reform has a direct 
negative impact on performance, and it also has an adverse impact on foreign direct 
investment. Investors feel more confident about putting their money into a country if it has 
been given the EU’s seal of approval.  
 
When other CEE countries apply to join, they are also likely to find that progress towards 
EU membership helps to encourage reforms, while loss of support for the reform process 
is detrimental to FDI inflows. Consequently, a loss of reform momentum seems likely to 
damage FDI receipts, and may well exacerbate a vicious circle of reduced investment and 10 
slower reform. So putting in an application may not be a good idea if there are likely to be 
many disappointments and long years before membership. 
 
 
Accession requirements are not the same as development needs 
Future aspirants need to recognize the opportunity costs of EU accession preparations. 
For countries that are unlikely to join the EU within the next ten to twenty years, it is unlikely 
to be optimal to expend enormous efforts in meeting EU standards and harmonizing with 
EU policies designed for established market economies, if this is at the cost of more 
immediate policies to establish sustainable economic growth. EU policies are often 
cumbersome to administer and implement. For countries that are likely to join soon, the 
overall benefits of EU membership certainly outweigh the short-term costs of sub-optimal 
policies and regulatory regimes. But countries that have little hope of meeting the 
conditions in full for many years might be better advised to use the eventual prospect of 
membership as an incentive to undertake basic reforms, rather than concentrating on the 
detail of EU policy models. The EU needs to develop a ‘core acquis’ which can be used to 
guide reforms, rather than presenting its rules and regulations as a monolith. 
 
The EU accession process has essentially based on the model for previous enlargements, 
rather than being designed specifically to assist and encourage transition economies. As a 
result, the structure of incentives and constraints that it imposes on economic and 
regulatory policies may be inappropriate for countries facing acute development and/or 
reconstruction problems. EU policy-makers tend to assume that accession and transition 
require  the same policies. However, although many accession-related policies are also 
required for successful economic transformation, applicants have to take on numerous EU 
policies that were developed for advanced, industrialized economies. They were not 
designed for countries in transition, and they often require a complex institutional structure 
for implementation that is little developed in many parts of South-Eastern Europe.  
 
The experience of Bulgaria and Romania over the past decade carries important lessons 
for the rest of the region. The accession process does not guarantee economic success or 
underwrite governmental programmes. It can help to anchor reforms, but there are other 
pre-requisites that the EU cannot provide: particularly important are the institutional 
capacity to implement laws and regulations, and a political consensus that provides 
continuity across changes of government. The EU helps governments to overcome 
opposition to unpopular measures, but EU has few sanctions that can be applied to 
unwilling governments: it can only encourage, not coerce. Future aspirants will find that 
they can only use an application to join the EU as a route to economic success if they 
already have both widespread political support for the necessary reforms and also 
adequate institutional resources to implement the measures demanded by the EU. The EU 
is no panacea for weak institutions and a lack of political consensus. 11 
Conclusions 
The European Union has politically committed itself to bringing in all of South-Eastern 
Europe – but not on a defined timetable. The Stabilization and Association Agreements 
signed between the EU and the countries of the region give all of the Balkans the prospect 
of eventual accession. However, that could happen within five years for Croatia, but it is 
likely to take well over a decade for Albania. And the exact timing of accession hangs not 
just on the preparations of would-be members; it also depends greatly on how the EU itself 
develops after its 2004 enlargement to ten new countries.  
 
The logic behind south-eastern accession is compelling for most EU policy-makers: it 
makes sense geographically for the EU to include the territory lying between Hungary and 
Greece, and between Italy and Bulgaria; historically and culturally, the Balkans has always 
been considered European; and in geo-political terms, the EU has largely taken 
responsibility for the whole region already. Moreover, there are few reasons for EU 
members to fear the eventual accession of fairly small countries. The debate in the EU 
about Balkan enlargement is consequently far less fraught than are discussions about 
large countries like Turkey or Ukraine as potential members. 
 
However, although South-Eastern Europe is much easier to absorb than Turkey, that does 
not mean the EU will expand quickly in that direction. As the EU has developed a fully 
fledged accession policy over the past 14 years, it has set ever more stringent conditions 
for joining. These conditions cover most aspects of the political institutions and economy of 
potential member-states. They require wannabe members to build elaborate institutional 
frameworks, undertake radical reforms of their economies and change many of their laws. 
The EU’s rules and regulations are also very expensive to implement. Poor countries with 
rickety public administrations and unstable political systems cannot meet these conditions 
quickly, even if they are small and close to the EU. 
 
Both the EU and potential SEE candidates need to think through the process very 
carefully, and not assume that it will have the same transformative effect as it did in Central 
and Eastern Europe if the extra-EU conditions of political consensus and economic growth 
are not in place first. The accession process carries costs as well as benefits, and where 
these fall depends greatly on how it is managed. The issue of EU accession is thus not a 
yes/no question: “Will we get in or won’t we?”. Rather, it is a long and uncertain process 
that has clear stages, but a variable timetable. The process has been profoundly 
transformative for the political systems, economies and legal frameworks of most of the 
countries that have joined. The more appropriate question is thus: “What effect will trying to 
join have on us?”.  12 
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